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Preface 
Not the least of the momentous events with which this millennium is ending 
is the second unification of Germany, the first having taken place in 1871. 
Because its initial unification was later than that of France Germany's local 
cultural differences have had less time to disappear into a homogeneous 
national culture. The same Prussia that under Bismarck had arranged the 
first unification has for 45 years been cut off from the rest of Germany, and 
this has added a further element of heterogeneity in the national culture. 
The extraordinary discipline that seems to be part of the German culture 
showed itself very differently in the two parts during the 45 years that they 
existed in virtual isolation from one another. On the one side this German 
character underlay the extraordinary economic achievements of the FRG; oe 
the other it showed itself in the orderly systematic stagnation of the GDR. 
That out of the ruins of World War II the national discipline could quickly 
build the leading economy of Europe, encourages the thought that the new 
Germany will relatively soon solve the problems of the old GDR. 
It is wholesome to be provided with a reminder that the national disci-
pline, so effective in the workplace as we see from the balance sheets of firms 
and of the nation, can serve evil purposes as well as benign ones. Pages 
14 and 15 of what follows give a chilling account of the demographic effects 
of the 12-year Nazi interlude. That period was enough to bring about the 
deaths of 40 million men and women in uniform, and over 20 million civilians, 
including some 5. 7 million put to death to serve "racial purity," whatever 
that means. Nothing can bring those people back, but at least the history 
will serve to remind mankind forever of the horror to which racial selection 
can lead. 
No nation values education more than Germany, and this has many ram-
ifications. It made Germany in its time first in the world in certain branches 
of science, particularly chemistry, and the training of its population at all 
levels of the educational system has been no small part of the means of its 
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rapid economic progress. But it also results in young people staying in school 
longer - often up to the age of 30 (page 37) - and this takes them past what 
are the years of maximum fertility in other countries. That cannot but have 
an effect on childbearing, that is already as low as any in the world. 
Low births mean fewer entrants into industry in the next generation, and 
hence a slower replacement of personnel at the workplace. As it becomes 
older the labor force will become more experienced, which is useful, but it 
could also be less innovative, less inclined to take the risks that are insepara-
ble from innovation. The net balance between experience and innovativeness 
is hard to foretell; what is certain is that the number of retired will increase 
in relation to the number of workers, and that the aged cannot be supported 
by taxes without setting in place further disincentives on work. And the 
same low fertility that makes the financing of social security difficult acts to 
prevent individual families from having the children who traditionally have 
been the solace and material support of parents. 
The paper does not pretend to explain all of the trends that it observes. 
Why does the life expectancy of West Germany (for instance at age 40) run 
parallel to that of East Germany up to 1975, and always somewhat below, 
and thereafter spurt ahead to the point where it is now most of two years 
higher (page 21)? Why is East German fertility so much higher than that of 
West Germany? Why do East German mothers bear at much younger ages 
(page 18)? Answers to such questions are not obvious. 
I cannot comment on all of the rich description and analysis contained in 
this paper, but can strongly recommend it as the best overall survey that we 
have had or are likely soon to have of the demographics of the newly united 
Germany. 
NATHAN KEYFITZ 
Leader 
Population Program 
Abstract 
When the two Germanies were reunited in 1990, 16 million East Germans 
were added to the West German population, giving it a 20 million person 
advantage over Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. This Population 
Bulletin traces the history of German population growth from the 1870s 
through World War II and up to the present. The authors examine the 
demographc trends of the new Germany and the prospects for future growth. 
Until 1990, marriage, fertility, and mortality followed different paths in 
the two countries. The wealthier West German women delayed marriage 
and childbearing, for example, and West German men lived longer than 
East German men. But these differences may reflect the pronatalist policies, 
repressive politics, and sagging economy of the former German Democratic 
Republic. Unification may eliminate many of these differences. 
Immigration - which triggered the demise of East Germany - has long 
played a crucial role in German demography. In recent decades, the influx 
of guestworkers from southern and eastern Europe has raised many sensitive 
issues for the public and policymakers. 
What will the future bring? Even if immigration and fertility increase, 
Germany faces population decline in the long term. The social and economic 
problems associated with an aging population remain a major concern of 
German policymakers. 
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Germany's Population: Turbulent Past, Uncertain 
Future 
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In a year of breathtaking change in 
Europe and the USSR, one of the most 
astonishing alterations of 1989-1990 
was the swift collapse of East Germany 
and its reunification with West Germany. 
Much of the explanation and impact of 
these events lies in the economic and 
political spheres. But a fundamental 
demographic process , migration , 
played a key role . This union creates a 
state that is far larger in population than 
any other country in Europe except for 
the Soviet Union, which spans both 
Europe and Asia. With a population of 
nearly 80 million (as of mid-1990), the 
united Germany contains about 20 mil-
lion more people than the next largest 
states of France, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom . Population size alone does 
not provide political power, but in con-
junction with the strength of the West 
German economy, the potential for politi-
cal and economic dominance suddenly 
has increased considerably. 
While a reunified Germany is regarded 
by many observers as an economic 
superpower, the demographic dimen-
sions that underlie the new German 
state raise some perplexing policy ques-
tions for the reunited country. In recent 
years, for example, both East and West 
Germany have experienced fertility lev-
els that are well below the long-run 
replacement level. Will the new united 
Germany reverse this trend and avoid 
a significant population decline? What 
role will immigration play in Germany's 
population and labor force growth? How 
will the aging of the population affect 
Germany's economic vitality? Will the 
united Germany assume the demo-
graphic trends and characteristics of 
East or West Germany, or will unity bring 
a blending of patterns and a new demo-
graphic future? 
This Population Bulletin looks at the 
demographic foundation of the past, 
present, and future of Germany. It 
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describes how migration helped precipi-
tate reunification and discusses the 
broader policy issues of immigration 
within German society. It also provides 
data on past and current patterns of mar-
riage, divorce, family formation, and 
household characteristics of the Ger-
man population. In addition , it looks 
ahead to Germany's future , providing 
projections of the reunited country 's 
future population size and composition . 
Germany in 1990 
On October 3, 1990, the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR) became a 
part of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG). The unification added 16.4 mil-
lion citizens, making the new German 
nation 's population 79.1 million. While 
this did not create a demographic 
"superpower," it raised Germany well 
above every other European nation. Its 
population is now some 20 million larger 
than that of Italy (57 million), the United 
Kingdom (57 million), or France (56 mil-
lion) (see Table 1 ). 
Unification also brought Germany 
more land area. Unified Germany now 
occupies about 357,000 square kilome-
ters (nearly 140,000 square miles). Lying 
in the midst of the continent and sharing 
borders with nine other countries, Ger-
many essentially' divides eastern and 
Table 1. Population Statistics for Germany and Selected European Countries, 
1989-1990 
1990 Natural Total 
population Births Deaths increase fert ility 
Country (millions) (per 1,000) (per 1,000) (per 100) rate' 
Germany 
West 62.6 10.9 11.2 - .03 1.4 
East 16.4 12.0 12.4 - .04 1.7 
Western Europe 
Austria 7.6 11 .5 10.9 +.06 1.4 
Belgium 9.9 11 .9 10.7 +.12 1.6 
France 56.4 13.8 9.4 +.44 1.8 
Netherlands 14.9 12.7 8.7 +.40 1.5 
Switzerland 6.7 12.2 9.2 +.30 1.6 
Northern Europe 
Denmark 5.1 11.5 11.6 - .01 1.6 
Finland 5.0 12.8 9.9 +.29 1.7 
Norway 4.2 14.0 10.6 +.34 1.8 
Sweden 8.5 13.6 10.8 +.28 2.0 
United Kingdom 57.4 13.6 11 .5 + .21 1.8 
Southern Europe 
Greece 10.1 10.8 9.3 + .15 1.5 
Italy 57.7 9.9 9.3 + .06 1.3 
Portugal 10.4 11 .9 9.6 +.23 1.6 
Spain 39.4 11 .2 7.9 +.33 1.5 
Eastern Europe 
Bulgaria 8.9 13.1 12.0 +.11 2.0 
Czechoslovakia 15.7 13.3 11 .6 +.17 2.1 
Hungary 10.6 11 .7 13.2 -.15 1.8 
Poland 37.8 14.9 10.1 + .48 2.1 
Romania 23.3 16.0 10.7 +.53 2.3 
'The average .number of births per woman during her lifetime. 
Source : United Nations, Population and Vital Statistics Report, data available as of October 1990; PRB, 1990 
World Population Data Sheet. 
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ADDENDUM (TO PAGE 5) 
Figure 1a: Population Density in Germany, by Administrative Districts ("Land· und Stadtkreise"), 
1989 
When the map on page 5 was drawn in the autumn of 1990 the new Federal States of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Brandenburg, Saxony, Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt did not yet exist. We therefore "constructed" Federal States by 
combining the former GDR districts. After unification the new borders of the Federal States were officially defined a little 
different than we had guessed. The new borders are shown in Figure 1 a. 
lnhabitants/sqkm 
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Figure 1. Population Density in Germany, by State, 1990 
Note: No state fe ll into the 550-999 category. 
Source: Table 2. 
Berlin 
lnhabitants/km2 
Ounder 100 
100-249 
1,000-4,000 
The color fo r the fourth population density cate-
gory : " 1,000- 4,000 inhabitants per square kilome-
ter " was printed incorrectly. Three areas, Bremen , 
Berlin , and Hamburg are included in this category. 
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western Europe. Its northern borders 
touch both the Baltic and the North 
Seas. Both its size and location have 
granted Germany strategic importance 
in modern Europe. 
Germans are not a homogeneous 
group. Regional diversity has long been 
a hallmark of the German people. The 
union of the eastern and western sec-
tions of the country in 1990 brought 
together people who share the same lan-
guage but differ in many ways. A large 
proportion of southern Germans are 
Catholic, for example, while the resi-
dents of the new eastern states are 
mostly Protestant. West Germans also 
tend to be more conservative on some 
social issues than are East Germans. 
The most fundamental differences 
between the east and west were political 
and economic. The German Democratic 
Republic adhered to a strict socialist 
regime while the Federal Republic 
emerged as a success story for capital-
ism. A thriving economy brought West 
Germans many advantages over their 
counterparts in the East. While official 
unemployment was nonexistent in the 
GDR, East Germans had lower incomes 
and lower living standards. The vast 
majority of West German households (97 
percent) had an automobile in 1988, 
while only 52 percent of East German 
households had one. Less than one-half 
of the households in the former GDR 
had a freezer in 1988 and only 1 O percent 
had an automatic washing machine. 
These conveniences are commonplace 
in West German households. 
The population is very unevenly distrib-
uted geographically (see Figure 1 ). West 
Germany is one of the most densely set-
tled areas in Europe, with an average 
population density of 252 persons per 
Table 2. Population and Vital Rates in German States, 1988-1989 
1989 Population Birth rate Death rate Natural population density increase 
Federal state (thousands) per km2' (per 1,000 populat ion) (percent/year) 
Bavaria 11,221 159 11.5 11 .0 + 0.5 
Lower Saxony 7,238 153 10.6 11.7 -1 .0 
Baden-Wurttemberg 9,619 269 11.7 9.9 + 1.8 
North Rhine-Westphalia 17,104 502 11 .0 11.2 - 0.2 
Brandenburg (GDR) 2,641 91 12.4 11 .8 + 0.6 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (GDR) 1,964 82 13.4 10.7 + 2.6 
Hesse 5,661 268 10.5 11.2 - 0.7 
Saxony-Anhalt (GDR} 2,965 145 11.7 12.7 - 1.0 
Rhineland-Palatinate 3,702 186 10.8 11.6 - 0.8 
Saxony (GDR) 4,901 267 11 .2 13.6 - 2.4 
Schleswig-Holstein 2,595 165 10.6 11.9 -1 .2 
Thuringia (GDR) 2,684 165 11.7 12.6 -0.7 
Saari and 1,065 414 10.1 11.7 - 1.6 
Hamburg 1,626 2,154 9.5 13.2 - 3.6 
Bremen 674 1,668 9.8 12.7 - 2.9 
East Berlin 1,279 3,174 13.2 10.4 + 2.8 
West Berlin 2,131 4,436 10.1 14.4 - 4.3 
Total Berlin 3,410 3,862 11 .2 12.7 - 1.6 
East 16,434 152 12.0 12.4 - 0.4 
West 62,636 252 11.0 11.3 - 0.3 
Germany 79,070 222 11.1 11.4 - 0.3 
• 1986 data .. 1988 data 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Wiesbaden; individual statistical bureaus for West German states; estimates 
for former East German districts were based on official statistics that will be subject to revision under a unified 
statistical system. 
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square kilometer in 1989. The heaviest 
population concentrations are in the 
industrial areas of North Rhine-Westpha-
lia (Ruhrgebiet), along the Rhine, and in 
the urban areas of Hamburg, Hannover, 
Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Nurnberg, and 
Munich . 
East Germany, with an average popula-
tion density of 152 persons per square 
kilometer, is sparsely populated by com-
parison. In the northern and western 
part of the former GDR several large 
rural districts contain just 30 to 40 per-
sonspersquare kilometer. Heavy popula-
tion concentrations are limited to Berlin 
and the southern industrial districts 
around the cities of Leipzig/Halle, Dres-
den, and Chemnitz (the former Karl-
Marx-Stadt) . 
Most other demographic indicators 
also vary regionally . The total fertility 
rate (TFR)-the average number of chil-
dren each woman will have under cur-
Infant Life expectancy Total 
mortality at birthc fertility 
rate0 Male Female rate' 
6.8 70.9 77.4 1.5 .. 
7.5 70.7 77.4 1.4 .. 
6.7 71.8 78.1 1.4' 
8.2 71 .8 78.4 1.4 .. 
7.7" 69.4 75.1 1.7 
6.7 .. 68.2 75.2 1.9 
7.4 72.6 78.8 1.6 .. 
8.2 .. 69.2 75.2 1.6 
7.7 70.4 77.1 1.4 .. 
6.8 .. 70.5 75.9 1.6 
6.7 71 .0 77.4 1.5 .. 
9.0 .. 69.7 75.6 1.5 
9.7 69.2 76.2 1.3 
8.0 70.5 77.3 1.3 
5.8 69.9 77.3 1.2· 
7.6 70.2 75.3 1.5 
8.6 68.6 75.8 1.4· 
8.1· · 1.5 
7.6 69.6 75.5 1.6 
7.5 71 .8 78.4 1.4 
7.5 .. 71 .3 77.8 1.5 
•1 square kilometer = 0.61 square miles 
01nfant deaths per 1,000 births per year 
cbased on 1985-1986 life tables 
' Average lifetime number of births per woman 
under current age-specific fertility rates 
rent fertility rates-varies between 1.9 
in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and 1.2 in 
Bremen. Female life expectancy at birth 
is 78.8 years in Hesse and 75.1 years in 
Brandenburg. Infant mortality ranges 
between 5.8 infant deaths per 1,000 
births in Bremen to 9.7 in Saarland . 
While there is natural population growth 
of 2.6 persons per 1,000 population each 
year in the sparsely populated East Ger-
man state of Mecklenburg-Vorpom-
mern, in most West German federal 
states deaths actually exceed births. 
Population declines are greatest in the 
states of Hamburg, Bremen , and Sax-
ony, which are losing between two and 
four persons per 1,000 every year 
through an excess of deaths (see 
Table 2) . 
The age structure in East and West 
Germany reflects the social , political , 
and economic turmoil that has plagued 
the European continent during the past 
100 years. A graph of the 1989 age struc-
ture (Figure 2) points to the major events 
that affected Germany's demographic 
history: the sharp decline in births dur-
ing World Wars I and II and during the 
worldwide economic recession of 1932. 
War casualties from World Wars I and II 
are still reflected in the dearth of males 
over age 60 (although higher life expec-
tancy for women is the major reason for 
the larger number of women at older 
ages) . Of the estimated 5.25 million Ger-
mans who died in World War II less than 
10 percent were civilians-most were 
men in uniform . 
One of the most characteristic fea-
tures of European age pyramids is the 
bulge of the post-war " baby boom," 
immediately followed by the smaller 
birth cohorts of the " baby bust. " In Ger-
many, the largest birth cohorts after the 
war were born between 1961 and 1967. 
The baby boomers strained Germany's 
education system as they proceeded 
through their school years. During the 
1980s, they faced strong competition 
when entering the university or seeking 
jobs. At the same time the smaller group 
of Germans born during the baby bust 
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Figure 2. United Germany's Population by Age and Sex, 1989 
Losses in 
world War I 
Male losses I Birth 
in world war 11 deficitC 
Birth deficit 1 
World War 11 L 
Post-war~ baby 
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World 
War I 
Baby 
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Echo 
effect 
--
~00 
90~ I Excess of 
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80 
"~Birth 7011,~ , • '• deficit I , , World 
1•• War I 
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World War II 
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20 
101 \ -u j 
Echo 
OI , ., effect 
1400 200 L~0~J 200 4001 
~-----FRG 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks, West (FRG) and East (GDR) Germany. 
of the mid-1970s was entering the educa-
tional system . Beginning in the late 
1980s there has been a slight increase 
of births. This upturn in births is primar-
ily an " echo-effect" created by the baby-
boom generation as it entered the child-
bearing ages. 
Another prominent feature of Ger-
many's current age structure is its large 
population of elderly. Like other Euro-
pean countries that have had low fertility 
for decades, the population is aging rap-
idly. In 1946, only 9 percent of the popula-
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tion was over age 65. In 1990, more than 
15 percent of the population was age 65 
and over; by 2020 that percentage could 
reach 25. In most European countries, 
12 to 15 percent of the population is 65 
or older, placing Germany just above 
average for the region . 
Conversely, the percentage of chil-
dren under age 15 has been declining 
from 25 percent in 1946 to about 15 per-
cent in 1990. Despite the shifts at the 
extremes of the age structure, however, 
the percentage of Germans aged 15 to 
64 has changed little since World War 
II. In 1990, an estimated 70 percent of 
Germans were in the prime working 
ages. The overall dependency ratio, or 
the ratio of the number of persons of 
working age to those in the dependent 
ages (under 15 and over 64), has actually 
declined slightly since 1946, from 0.51 to 
0.44. Low birth rates and the consequent 
drop in the under-15 age group are the 
prime reason for the decline. 
Marriage patterns have varied substan-
tially between East and West Germans. 
East Germans have been more likely to 
marry, and at a younger age, than West 
Germans. At the end of the 1980s, mar-
riage rates in East Germany ranged from 
7.9 to 10.2 marriages per 1,000 popula-
tion ; in West Germany they varied from 
5.9 to 6.6, conforming to the predomi-
nant pattern in other western European 
countries. 
While in other European countries a 
large proportion of young couples live 
in a nonmarital union (30 to 44 percent 
of Swedes in their 30s live together with-
out marrying), only a small minority do 
so in West Germany. In 1988, roughly 0.8 
million couples lived together outside 
marriage in West Germany, less than 3 
percent of all households. Also, while 
nearly one-quarter of all births in 
England and France , and one-half of 
births in Sweden occurred out of wed-
lock in the late 1980s, 1 West German 
births have remained a product of legal 
marriage. More than 90 percent of all 
West German couples marry before, or 
shortly after, they have a child . In East 
Germany, in contrast, one-third of all 
births occur out of wedlock. 
But the relatively low proportion of 
nonmarital unions understates the fun-
damental changes that have occurred in 
German society in the past few decades. 
In 1972 only some 130,000 West German 
couples (of all age groups) lived in non-
marital unions. By 1988 this number had 
increased six-fold .2 The shifts since 1972 
are likely harbingers of further move-
ment away from traditional marital pat-
terns. Also , more and more German 
adults are remaining single; the single 
lifestyle has become a common alterna-
tive to either marriage or nonmarital 
unions. 
Germany's Demographic 
History: 1871-1946 
Prior to 1871 , there was no German 
national state, just a collection of diverse 
states that shared a common ethnic and 
linguistic heritage. In that year, the Prus-
sian statesman, Otto von Bismarck suc-
ceeded in bringing together these 
fiercely independent political units to 
form a German nation-state of some 41 
million persons. The German Reich of 
1871 encompassed about 40 percent 
more territory than unified Germany 
today. As 19th century Germany was 
undergoing this profound political 
change, it was also experiencing funda-
mental social and economic changes 
that helped transform it from a predomi-
nantly agrarian state into a highly indus-
trialized urban society. 
These social and economic changes 
were triggered by the Industrial Revolu-
tion, which had begun in Great Britain 
toward the end of the 18th century and 
swept across most of Europe during the 
next 100 years.3 New values and aspira-
tions arrived with new technolo-
gies and more efficient methods of pro-
duction , affecting all aspects of every-
day life. New types of households and 
living arrangements arose as more peo-
ple left their farms to seek a livelihood in 
urban areas. The historically high birth 
and death rates began to fall , ushering 
in what is commonly known as the 
" demographic transition ." 
Germany's Demographic Transition 
In the 1870s, Germany's population was 
growing at more than 1 percent a year. 
High birth rates and declining death 
rates caused natural increase (the 
excess of births over deaths) to rise . The 
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German population increased from 41 
million to 56 million between 1871 and 
1900, straining the limits of available 
farmland. Population pressure helped 
fuel a large-scale emigration of Germans 
to less-settled regions. From 1871 to 
1900, approximately 2.5 million Ger-
mans emigrated, and more than 90 per-
cent settled in the United States.4 Most 
of the emigrants came from the eastern 
parts of the German Reich where 
incomes were low and jobs scarce. 
After the turn of the century, rapid 
industrialization improved Germany's 
economic situation and made it easier 
to accommodate a larger population . 
Outmigration declined even though pop-
ulation growth had accelerated slightly. 
The number of Germans rose from 56 to 
65 million during the first three decades 
of the 20th century. 5 Population growth 
rates did not begin a significant decline 
until after 1925. 
German death rates began a rapid 
descent in the mid-1880s, according to 
registered statistics available after 1871. 
Birth rates entered a steep decline after 
1900 (see Figure 3). Births continued to 
exceed deaths after the peak of the tran-
sition period. Germany continued to 
grow through natural increase from 
1915 to 1972, except during the two 
world wars. Since 1972, however, deaths 
have exceeded births, and the popula-
tion has declined, except for a few years 
when net immigration was great enough 
to offset the excess of deaths over births. 
During the first decade of the 20th cen-
tury, German women gave birth to more 
than four children each on average, 
according to demographer Patrick 
Festy. 6 He found that the transition from 
high to low fertility began with women 
born between 1872-1880, and pro-
Figure 3. Historical Trends in Birth and Death Rates, Germany, 1841-1989 
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ceeded quite slowly. Completed fertility 
first dropped below a three-child aver-
age for women born after 1882. 
The German experience runs counter 
to a common explanation of the demo-
graphic transition: that a decline in 
infant mortality motivated couples to 
reduce their fertility in order to compen-
sate for the increasing number of surviv-
ing children. In a detailed analysis of all 
71 administrative areas of the German 
Reich, John Knodel discovered that "the 
decline in infant mortality could not have 
been an initiating cause of the fertility 
decline in most areas," because fertility 
began to fall before, or at the same time 
as infant mortality.7 
With the decline of fertility and mortal-
ity, other demographic characteristics 
also changed in Germany. The average 
size of households decreased rapidly. In 
1900, 44 percent of all households con-
tained five or more members. By 1925, 
only 33 percent of German households 
included this many, and by 1950only16 
percent of households included five or 
more members. 
Marriage patterns also changed . The 
average age at marriage for single 
women increased from 24.8 years in 
1911 to 26.2 years in 1938. For single 
men, it rose from 27.4 to 28.8 years of 
age over the same period . Divorce rates 
more than quadrupled, from 7.4 
divorces per 10,000 married persons in 
1890 to 31 .1 per 10,000 in 1938. 
Declines in fertility and mortality led to 
a shift from a younger to an older age 
population structure. In 1871, the age 
composition of the German population 
was still typical of a pre-industrial soci-
ety, or of many less developed countries 
today (see Figure 4). Some 34 percent 
of the population was under age 15, 61 
percent was age 15-64, and only 4.6 per-
cent of the population was age 65 or 
older. By 1939, the children's share of 
the population had declined to 23 per-
cent, the percentage of ad u Its age 15 to 
64 had increased to 69 percent of the 
total, and that of the elderly equaled 7.8 
percent. 
Social and Economic Background 
of the Transition 
The demographic transition in Germany 
resulted from a complex pattern of 
social, economic, and cultural changes 
that triggered the decline of both mortal-
ity and fertility. 
Between 1882 and 1939, the total labor 
force in the German Reich increased 
from 17 to some 36 million persons. Dur-
ing the same period the percentage 
working in agriculture declined from 41 
to 18 percent among males and from 45 
to 38 percent among females. 6 
Women's lives changed fundamen-
tally during the first decades of the 20th 
century. No longer were they restricted 
to the three "K"s: Kinder, KtJche, Kirche, 
a well known phrase in German, mean-
ing "children, kitchen , church." More 
women joined the labor force . The 
female labor force in Germany grew by 
157 percent between 1882 and 1939, 
while the male labor force increased by 
91 percent. The percentage of women 
15 to 65 years of age who were employed 
had risen from 43 to 52 percent. 
Many of these changes in women 's 
lives were fueled by new inventions and 
machines introduced in the late 1800s. 
Inventions such as the typewriter (mass-
production of the "Remington" started 
in 1873) and the telephone switchboard 
system (introduced in 1877) created mil-
lions of jobs that were filled predomi-
nately by women. The emergence of a 
female labor market weakened the tradi-
tional , family-oriented perspective of 
many women, extending their horizons 
beyond household and family. This in 
turn led more women to delay or forgo 
marriage and childbearing. 
At the same time, a major shift in popu-
lation distribution occurred . The grow-
ing industries in urban areas attracted 
laborers from the countryside. Between 
1870 and 1910, the percentage of Ger-
mans living in cities or towns with over 
2,000 inhabitants increased from 36 to 
60 percent. Large metropolitan areas 
grew up, dominated by the traditional 
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Figure 4. Germany's Changing Population Pyramid, 1871-1988 
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capital, Berlin. Berlin grew from some 
827,000 to 2.5 million between 1871 and 
1900. By 1930, its population had 
reached 3.7 million.9 
But the move to the cities signaled 
more than a local redistribution of the 
population . A large proportion of Ger-
mans had left the closed social world of 
the village and embraced the pluralistic, 
stimulating culture of the city. Accompa-
nying this movement was an erosion of 
the power of the church and an expan-
sion of the role of the state. 
In 1872, under the direction of Reichs-
kanzler Bismarck, the control of German 
public schools was wrenched away from 
the church and given to the state. The 
state began to devote more funds to 
improve and expand its system of educa-
tion. From 1870 to 1890 state expendi-
tures on education and research more 
than doubled as a result of Bismarck's 
reforms. Enrollment at German universi-
ties soared from 18,000 in 1869 to 40,000 
in 1896 and 91,000 in 1925. More Ger-
man women entered the universities, a 
consequence of the expansion of female 
education at lower levels. Less than 1 
percent of university students were 
women in 1907; within 20 years their 
share exceeded 10 percent. 10 
The secularization of the educational 
system was only' part of a larger restruc-
turing of German society. Civil marriage 
was introduced, as was legislation that 
prohibited priests from using the pulpit 
to agitate on political matters. Compul-
sory health insurance was established 
for blue collar workers-the first such 
program in the world . A pension system 
was created. 
These changes not only deepened the 
separation between state and church , 
but hastened the emergence of new sec-
ular values and norms. Germans' atti-
tudes toward sexuality, family forma-
tion, and childbearing became less tradi-
tional and less predictable. 
Many of these social and economic 
changes worked to lower German birth 
rates. As jobs for women expanded, the 
years of unpaid labor devoted to raising 
a large family were seen in a different 
light. They constituted lost employment 
opportunities. As Germans moved from 
the farm to the cities, they no longer 
needed the type of labor children could 
provide. Children spent more years in 
school, increasing the time they 
remained dependent on their families. 
The notion that women could limit the 
number of children they bore gained 
wider social acceptance. The knowl-
edge and practice of birth control meth-
ods expanded. Many parents believed 
that by having fewer children they could 
achieve a higher quality of life for them-
selves and their families. 
Declines in Mortality 
Unlike Third World countries today, 
where rapid mortality decl ine is usually 
related to vaccination campaigns , 
expanded use of drugs such as penicil-
lin, and improved medical treatments, 
the mortality decline in 19th century Ger-
many had little to do with modern medi-
cine. Death rates started to fall decades 
before these medical interventions 
became available. The BCG tuberculosis 
vaccine was only discovered in 1908, 
penicillin was mass-produced after 
1940, and the drugs isoniazid and strep-
tomycin (to treattubercu losis) were avail-
able only after 1951. 
The rapid decline of German mortality 
around the turn of the 20th century was 
mainly a result of three related factors. 
These were : 
• major improvements in basic sanitary 
conditions ; 
• a stabilization of food supply ; and 
• the development of a few basic medi-
cal techniques, such as sterile condi-
tions in maternity wards. 
The unruly congestion brought about by 
the rapid urbanization of Germany has-
tened these developments. When the 
population began to concentrate in 
urban areas, sanitation problems 
worsened and some diseases became 
virulent. During the second half of the 
19th century, epidemics of cholera and 
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other diseases broke out in several 
cities, spreading rapidly through the 
crowded housing quarters. The govern-
ment was forced to improve the waste 
disposal systems and the water supply. 
The availability of clean drinking water 
in the cities might have been the largest 
single factor initiating the decline of 
infant morbidity and mortality. 
The Industrial Revolution changed the 
living conditions in the countryside as 
well. Despite the fact that the agricul-
tural labor force was shrinking due to 
migration to the cities, agricultural pro-
duction increased. Between 1873 and 
1912, the production of wheat grew from 
2.8 to 4.4 million tons, rye production 
increased from 7.3 to 11 .6 million tons, 
and potato production more than dou-
bled from 23.6 to 50.2 million tons. While 
the population of the German Reich 
grew by 59 percent, from 41.6 to 66.1 
million, the production of basic food sta-
ples nearly doubled. Germany's food 
supply expanded during the period of its 
demographic transition , another strik-
ing divergence from the conditions in 
many Third World countries today. 
Regional and Social Differences 
In some areas and in some social 
groups, fertility and mortal ity remained 
high until the 1930s. In others, the 
decline was nearly over by the beginning 
of the 20th century. Demographic statis-
tics on a national level mask these 
regional and social differences that are 
so typical of the German population. 
Fertility and mortality decline usually 
began in large cit ies, spread to medium 
and small towns, and then to rural areas. 
In general, the more wealthy populat ion 
groups were the first to reduce fertility, 
while the lower classes, including farm 
workers and miners, lagged behind. A 
study based on 1939 census data 
revealed that fertility had declined first 
among physicians, university profes-
sors, army officers and artists.11 
Religion was another important factor. 
The urban Jewish population was the 
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Box 1. The Dark Chapter: Nazi 
There is a chapter in German demogra-
phy whose pages too many of our coun-
trymen would like to skip : National 
Socialism and the Holocaust. But this 
darkest period in German history 
should never be forgotten, especially 
not amidst the joy of the reunification 
and certainly not in a report on German 
demography. 
Germany's demographic history was 
involved in this tragedy in two ways. 
First, the population structure of a 
large part of Europe was dramatically 
changed as a result of the Holocaust 
and World War II. Second, the excesses 
of the Nazi regime in the name of purify-
ing the race cast a heavy shadow over 
the science of demography in Ger-
many. In the post-war rejection of 
Nazism, German politicians have been 
reluctant to propose explicit popula-
tion policies, lest they be linked to Nazi 
excesses. 
In what is now called the Holocaust, 
the Nazis systematically tried to eradi-
cate an entire population group, the 
Jews. Jews all over Germany and Ger-
man-occupied Europe were pursued 
and incarcerated. Millions were killed 
in the gas chambers of German concen-
tration camps at Auschwitz-Birkenau, 
Maidanek, or Trebl inka. In the name of 
purifying the race, the Nazis also tried 
to eliminate other religious and ethnic 
minorities, such as the Roma (the 
nomadic gypsies), and " undesirables" 
such as the disabled and homosexuals. 
The Nazi pol ice relentlessly pursued 
and prosecuted members of the politi-
cal opposition in Germany and mem-
bers of the resistance in occupied coun-
tries. The exact numbers will never be 
known, but according to detailed esti-
mates up to 5.7 million people, mainly 
Jews from eastern European coun-
tries, were killed in the gas chambers 
of the Third Reich. 
Germany 
The systematic slaughter of human 
beings in the concentration camps was 
only part of the death toll exacted by 
the National Socialists. The Nazis' 
attack on Poland (September 1, 1939) 
triggered a continental war that esca-
lated into a worldwide military conflict 
in which 53 countries participated. 
During World War II some 40 million 
soldiers lost their lives on battlefields 
all over the world. Another 15 million 
civilians were killed. The Soviet Union 
suffered the largest losses of human 
life: 20.6 million soldiers and 7 million 
civilians. 1 
In the 1920s and 1930s, German 
demography-markedly different from 
the present-day science-was mis-
used by the Nazis and lent ideological 
support to the rise of fascism. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, Social 
Darwinism was widespread in Europe. 
This popular philosophy-which 
expanded the evolutionary process of 
the " survival of the fittest" to 
humans-had many roots . One was 
J.A. Gobineau's pseudo-scientific the-
ory on the " inequality of the human 
races," which was spread throughout 
19th century Europe by H. St. Chamber-
lain, founder of the Eugenics Society. 
Some German demographers of the 
period used these ideas to establish 
an academic discipline that blatantly 
propagated racism. They called it Ras-
senhygiene. Biological heritage, they 
argued, determines the quality of 
humans and their value for society. 
They distinguished " valuable" from 
"useless" individuals and races. Natu-
ral selection of the strongest races was 
seen to be the driving force of history. 
It was a short step from this " theory" 
to the contemptuous program of eutha-
nasia that would cleanse the German 
"blood" of " cripples " and " useless 
human beings" (Programm zur Ver-
nichtung unwerten Lebens) . Legiti-
mized by statistical studies prepared 
by German demographers, the Nazis 
killed thousands of individuals with 
physical or mental disabilities or with 
hereditary diseases before the 
churches could stop the program. 
At the same time, the "racially pure" 
Germans were encouraged to have 
large families. Specific policies, includ-
ing marriage loans and child-allow-
ances, were instituted by the National 
Socialists to increase the birth rate 
among ethnic Germans. Motherhood 
was touted as a patriotic duty as well 
as a woman's highest goal. Access to 
contraceptives and abortion was 
severely curtailed.2 
These demographers dreamed the 
evil dream of Superior Men (Herren-
menschen) who had to " purify their 
blood" from the impure heritage of 
slaves (Untermenschen).3 In time, their 
names will be forgotten in our disci-
pline, but their dangerous ideology 
should not be, lest it re-emerge. 
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first to experience a rapid decline of fer-
tility, followed by the Protestants. 
Among Catholics, who were more likely 
to live in the mostly rural south of Ger-
many, fertility decline came last. Their 
birth rates remained above those of Prot-
estants and Jews for decades. Eventu-
ally, all religious and social groups and 
all regions adopted modern patterns of 
fertility, mortality, and nuptiality. 
By the late 1920s, the birth rate was 
falling so fast that demographers began 
to project eventual population decline. 
The growing interest in eugenics (the 
science of improving human genetic 
stock) was intensified by the idea that 
certain population groups might 
decline. On the eve of World War 11 , (see 
Box 1 ), many Germans and other Europe-
ans already were beginning to worry 
about negative population growth. 
Recent Demographic 
Trends: 1946-1990 
Fertility 
As in many other European countries, 
Germany experienced a baby boom dur-
ing the 1960s, followed by a baby bust. 
Despite the difference in political and 
economic systems, the baby boom was 
nearly identical in its timing and level of 
fertility in both Germanies. As in most 
countries, a spurt in birth rates right 
after World War II was followed by a sus-
tained period of high fertility . The baby 
boom in Germany, as in other countries, 
was in part caused by an increase in 
marriage. Greater proportions of women 
were getting married and at younger 
ages. 
Figure 5. Total Fertility Rates in East and West Germany, 1950-1989 
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Box 2. East German Policies to Encourage Childbearing 
A number of European countries with 
below-replacementfertility have imple-
mented policies that-directly or indi-
rectly-are aimed at increasing the 
national birth rate. The success rate 
has been poor. In the German Demo-
cratic Republic, however, the effect of 
pronatalist policies on national fertility 
rates is clearly visible. 
In May 1976, the East German govern-
ment introduced a set of policy mea-
sures designed to boost the fertility 
rate, which had slipped below replace-
ment afterthe liberalization of"abortion 
in 1972. The most important provisions 
to encourage couples to have more 
children were : 
• Length.ening paid maternity leave 
from 18 to 26 weeks, and 
• Instituting a one-year paid maternity 
leave for mothers with two or more 
children . 
These benefits were not extraordinary 
by European standards. But they were . 
well publicized in the GDR and appar-
ently received broad public approval. 
The benefits package was viewed as a 
major improvement in the lives of 
women with children . 
The effects of social policies often 
defy quantification. How can the 
effects of the policy be separated from 
The steep decline in fertility rates 
between 1967 and 1974 also occurred 
simultaneously in East and West Ger-
many. After birth rates peaked in the 
mid-1960s, they fell by about 40 percent 
in only seven years. The decline was 
steeper in both German states than in 
most other European countries. 
After 197 4, birth rates in the two Ger-
manies began to diverge, probably as a 
result of explicit policies instituted by 
the East German government to encour-
other factors, such as economic reces-
sion or political instability? But a 
recent study clearly demonstrates the 
fertility-boosting effect of the East Ger-
man policies after 1976, and finds that 
the pronatalist measures increased fer-
tility in the GDR by about 20 percent. 1 
Closer examination of East German 
fertility over the past two decades 
reveals more specific effects of the pro-
natalist measures. Many aspects of the 
policies favored women with larger 
families-two or more children. In fact, 
after 1982, the probability of having sec-
ond and third births was up by 30 per-
cent, and even rose above the relatively 
high pre-1970 birth rates. The probabil-
ity of having a first birth initially 
increased, but then fell below its previ-
ous level. The net effect of the policies 
was to significantly increase fertility in 
the GDR. The laws favored women who 
already had children, encouraging 
them to go ahead and have another 
one or two, but had no effect on child-
less women. Levels of childlessness in 
the GDR were unchanged. 
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age couples to have more children (see 
Box 2) . Fertility continued to decline in 
West Germany, however. Between 1975 
and 1985, women in East Germany had 
on average almost half a child more than 
women in West Germany. In 1985, the 
West German TFR hit an historic low, 
slipping just below 1.3 children per 
woman (see Figure 5). It was then the 
lowest national TFR ever recorded in 
peacetime, generating much interna-
tional attention and musings about the 
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eventual disappearance of the German 
population . 
In the late 1980s, however, the fertility 
gap between the two Germanies had 
begun to narrow, and by 1989 both popu-
lations recorded TFRs of about 1.5 chil-
dren per woman . With the unification of 
the two countries in 1990, this strange 
divergence in TFRs may remain only an 
intriguing historical episode. 
Age Patterns of Fertility 
Even in the 1950s, East German women 
tended to have children at younger ages 
than their West German cousins. By 
1985 two significantly different age pat-
terns of family formation had evolved 
(see Figure 6) . In East Germany, child-
bearing was increasingly concentrated 
in the late teens and early 20s. In West 
Germany, it had shifted toward the older 
ages, much as it had in the United States 
and in other European countries. 12 
These distinct patterns of fertility 
apparently grew out of the different 
social and economic conditions of East 
and West Germany. In the former GDR, 
almost all women combined mother-
hood and employment. Both mother-
hood and labor force participation were 
considered obligatory. In the United 
States and in other European countries, 
women often delay childbearing to estab-
lish a career. In the GDR, however, it 
was easier for women to combine these 
competing goals at younger ages, 
before assuming more demanding pro-
fessional responsibilities. Furthermore, 
career advancement opportunities were 
limited in East Germany, and young 
women had little to gain by delaying 
motherhood. The dense network of inex-
pensive child-care centers, comprehen-
sive maternity benefits, and other ser-
vices helped women combine raising 
young children with working . 
Labor force statistics for women in the 
two countries lend credence to th is 
explanation . East German women enter 
the labor force at a fairly young age and 
do not exit during the prime childbear-
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Figure 6. Age-Specific Fertility Rates, 
East and West Germany, 1985 
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ing years. In fact, a greater percentage 
of East German women at all adult ages 
are employed . Overall , 83 percent of 
East German women age 15 to 59 work 
outside the home, compared to 50 per-
cent of West German women. Most West 
German women work during their early 
20s, but a large percentage leave the 
work force during their young adult 
ages, presumably to raise children . They 
re-enter the job market as they reach 
their 30s and early 40s, when their chil-
dren would be more self-sufficient. 13 
Beginning motherhood at a younger 
rather than older age was socially pre-
ferred in East Germany. Attitude surveys 
in the 1980s found that having children , 
along with professional work, received 
the highest rating among a large number 
of values. Some analysts think that by 
having children at a very young age, 
young East Germans were searching for 
privacy and expressing their individual-
ism as a reaction against an increasingly 
repressive political environment. 
Childlessness 
Even before 1974, when birth rates in the 
two Germanies were almost identical , 
the average East and West German fami-
lies were very different. In East Germany 
almost every woman had at least one 
child, whereas in West Germay, a high 
percentage of women were childless. 
Overall rates were similar in the early 
1970s because West German women 
who did have children had a larger num-
ber of them. Since then the differences 
in family types have only widened . 
In 1981, only 11 percent of all East Ger-
man women age 45 were childless. Even 
lower percentages of younger women 
were childless: only 7 percent of the 
women born in 1951, for example. An 
estimated 10 percent of East German 
women will remain childless throughout 
their lives.14 
The percentage of West German cou-
ples still childless after 11 to 15 years of 
marriage increased between 1970 and 
1980, from 11 percent to 15 percent.15 
The figure may have reached 19 percent 
by 1986. During the same period, mar-
riage rates declined; an estimated 25 per-
cent of all women will remain unmarried, 
under current trends. Because the pro-
portion of children born out of wedlock 
has remained below 10 percent in West 
Germany, an estimated 35 to 40 percent 
of all women will remain childless, if cur-
rent patterns continue. 
Out-of-Wedlock Births 
While the proportion of births to unmar-
ried women remained low in the West, 
about one-third of East German births 
occurred outside of marriage in the late 
The East German government built /ow-cost child-care centers to encourage women to have more children. 
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1980s. There are obvious reasons for 
this discrepancy: the support systems 
for younger single mothers were better 
in the GDR, a consequence of the prona-
talist policies instituted in the 1970s. It 
was quite common, and socially accept-
able, for a young East German woman 
to bear a child while a student and 
unmarried. This behavior was reflected 
in the younger mean age for childbear-
ing and the lower proportion childless 
discussed above. Unmarried mothers in 
West Germany, in contrast, do not enjoy 
wide social acceptance and suffer from 
a lack of child-care facilities. 
Will these differences persist after uni-
fication? If the differences indeed grew 
out of political systems, it stands to rea-
son that the East Germans will come to 
act more like their western cousins. How-
ever, the more liberal attitudes toward 
out-of-wedlock childbearing-already 
more accepted in the rest of Europe-
could disrupt the more traditional West 
German patterns of family formation. 
Abortion 
Abortion is one of the most contentious 
issues to emerge during the unification 
process. Until unification, the states in 
the former GDR usually allowed any 
woman an abortion within the first 12 
weeks of pregnancy. Abortion law in the 
FRG is more restrictive: women seeking 
an abortion have to face a commission 
that decides the issue on the basis of 
certain medical and social indications. 
At the time of reunification, neither side 
was comfortable adopting the laws of 
the other. 
Conceding the need to craft a law 
acceptable to the majority of both East 
and West Germans, the government has 
given the new parliament until 1992 to 
create the new legislation. Until new leg-
islation is enacted , the present laws will 
be enforced in the respective territories. 
But unification has already expanded 
the availability of abortion : west German 
women may now go to eastern Germany 
for an abortion. 
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In the late 1980s, the number of regis-
tered abortions was about the same in 
East and West Germany, despite the 
large difference in population size. 
Annual registered abortions ranged 
between 80,000 and 90,000 in both coun-
tries. In 1989, the official rate was 371 
abortions per 1,000 births in the former 
GDR and 110 in the FRG .16 However, it 
is widely assumed that a large propor-
tion of abortions in the FRG are never 
registered. Taking non-registered abor-
tions into account, the abortion rates 
may be similar in the two Germanies. 
Gains in Life Expectancy 
In the 45 years since the end of World 
War II, the average life expectancy in 
both parts of Germany increased remark-
ably, as it did in most European coun-
tries. After 1970, however, the rate of 
improvement in life expectancy slowed 
in East Germany, while it accelerated in 
the West. The German situation 
reflected a growing gap in mortality 
rates between eastern and western Euro-
pean countries.17 
Average life expectancy rose further 
in West than in East Germany, and was 
high.er for women than for men . 
Between 1950 and 1986, life expectancy 
at birth in the west increased by more 
than 7 years for men and by almost 10 
years for women. In East Germany, it 
rose by 5.6 years for men and 7.5 years 
for women. The gap between East and 
West German I ife expectancies 
increased so much during this postwar 
period that by 1986 West German men 
lived 2.3 years longer than East German 
men and West German women lived an 
average 2.9 years longer. 
Infant mortality is a sensitive indicator 
of a country's standard of living, espe-
cially the effectiveness of medical ser-
vices. Immediately after World War II, the 
infant mortality rate was 26 percent 
higher in East than in West Germany: 
131.4 infant deaths per 1,000 live births 
compared with 97.1 deaths per 1,000 
births. Over the following 20 years, how-
Figure 7. Life Expectancy at Age 40, East and West German Men, 1950-1987 
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ever, infant mortality in East Germany 
declined faster than, and for a short 
period during the early 1970s it even fell 
below, the West German rate. In 1989, 
however, just 8 of every 1,000 newborns 
died within their first year of life in both 
parts of Germany, putting Germany in a 
middle-range position among industrial-
ized countries. 
Most of the divergence in life expec-
tancy arises from higher death rates 
among adults, particularly among men 
(see Figure 7) rather than differences in 
infant and childhood mortality. Much of 
this difference can be tied to specific 
causes of death in the two countries (see 
Table 3). In East Germany, accidents and 
diseases like diabetes and circulatory 
problems that can be ameliorated 
through diet, life style, or improved 
safety were dominant causes of death. 
Death rates from cancer were quite simi-
lar in both countries. 
Diseases of the circulatory system, the 
major cause of death in both countries, 
claimed only two-thirds the proportion 
of West German as East German lives in 
1988. The death rate from diabetes in the 
FAG was less than half the level in East 
Germany, probably reflecting the same 
diet and life style factors responsible for 
the lower mortality from circulatory dis-
ease. Accidental deaths (except from 
automobiles) were significantly lower in 
West Germany. Although deaths from 
accidents represent a small share of all 
deaths, they are concentrated in the 
younger ages , making the effect on 
potential years of life lost quite signifi-
cant. 
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Table 3. Major Causes of Death in East and West Germany, 1988 
Cause-specific death rates 
Cause of death 
(deaths per 100,000 population) 
East Germany 
Total Males 
Circulatory diseases 839.5 711 .4 
Cancer/Neoplasms 234.4 248.0 
Respiratory diseases 79.5 96.7 
Accidents 45.0 52.5 
Diabetes mellitus 40.2 26.9 
Standardized on 1987 FRG population 
Source: Authors ' calculations from published statistics. 
Marriage and Divorce 
Since 1972 West Germany has experi-
enced not only a birth deficit, but also a 
"marriage deficit. " Marriage dissolu-
tions (by divorce, death of a spouse, or 
other reasons) have outnumbered wed-
dings. In 1988, 398,000 West Germans 
got married, but 415,000 marriages were 
dissolved. Marriage dissolutions have 
outnumbered weddings in East Ger-
many, too, for most of the 1970s and 
1980s. 
Although both Germanies experi-
enced a marriage deficit, marriage pat-
terns were quite different in the two 
countries. East Germans not only are 
more likely to marry than West Germans, 
but they do so at much younger ages. At 
age 25, East German men are two and a 
half times more likely to be married as 
West German men. 
What caused this difference in mar-
riage patterns? Have traditional family-
oriented values persisted much longer 
in East Germany, or has marriage behav-
ior been a reflection of social and eco-
nomic conditions in both states? 
One reason for higher nuptiality in the 
former German Democratic Republic 
could be its family-oriented social policy 
that rewards young couples who marry 
and have children .18 The policy mea-
sures ranged from direct and indirect 
financial benefits and legal regulations 
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West Germany 
Females Total Males Females 
957.8 561 .0 509.6 608.6 
221 .9 272.7 282.8 263.3 
63.6 65.0 77.8 53.1 
38.0 32.0 36.9 27.4 
52.5 18.6 13.0 23.7 
(such as maternity leave) to the provi-
sion of housing and low-cost child care. 
Some of these incentives were so strong 
that one might call them " sanctions " 
against remaining single or childless. 
Housing was scarce in the GDR, and it 
was allotted by the government accord-
ing to a preference system. Under East 
German laws, couples had the best 
chance to get a flat of their own if they 
were married and had a child. 
Certain marriage credits were given 
only to those under age 26 (or age 30 
after 1986), encouraging couples to 
marry young. There is statistical evi-
dence that these government policies 
did influence marriage behavior in East 
Germany. Before these policies were 
implemented in 1972, marriage rates by 
age formed a smooth curve that peaked 
at age 21 for women and 24 for men. 
After that time, rates at age 25 shot up, 
especially for men, and then fell off dra-
matically at age 26 (see Figure 8), clearly 
reflecting the age limit for receiving the 
housing credit. 
Children and Divorce 
In both parts of Germany, divorces 
increased afterthe 1950s, especially dur-
ing the early 1970s. Between 1977 and 
1980, divorce rates in West Germany 
dropped precipitously to about one-
third the previous level. This decline 
proved to be the temporary result of 
reforms of the divorce laws, rather than 
an embrace of marriage. The divorce 
rate rose back to previous levels during 
the 1980s. 
Increasing divorce rates and a grow-
ing number of single-parent families in 
Germany have serious consequences 
for the living conditions of children. In 
West Germany, where over 90 percent 
of all births are still within marriages, an 
estimated one-half of the children 
already born will experience the divorce 
or separation of their parents. Most of 
these children will live with their moth-
ers, either in a one-parent family* or 
within a new step-family. 
In 1988 there were 6.9 million families 
with children under age 18 in West Ger-
many.19 Some 86 percent of children 
were living within a marriage, but not 
necessarily the one in which they were 
born . Children living in a single-parent 
'We use the term one-parent family to mean one 
adult living together with a child (or children) . The 
adult usually is a parent of the child , but children 
may also live with other relatives such as a grand-
mother or aunt. 
Figure 8. First Marriage Rates by Age, 
East and West German Men, 1985 
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family usually stay with their mother, but 
approximately 14 percent of single-par-
ent families with children under age 18 
were headed by men in 1988. In contrast, 
some 75 percent of U.S. children lived in 
a married-couple family in 1989. 
Shrinking Household Size 
As in the United States and other Euro-
pean countries , German households 
contain fewer and fewer people. Nearly 
two-thirds of the 27 million households 
enumerated in the annual West German 
micro-census in 1987 included only one 
or two persons. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, 
households of only one person were rare 
in Germany. Between 1925 and 1950, 
however, the proportion of one-person 
households nearly tripled , from 7 to 19 
percent. During the next 40 years the 
number of one-person households 
increased to 35 percent of all house-
holds in West Germany and to 27 per-
cent of households in the former GDR. 
This tremendous increase resulted from 
two independent developments-the 
aging of the population and the delay 
(or rejection) of marriage among young 
adults. 
Increasing life expectancy has created 
a rapidly-growing group of single house-
holds, especially among elderly women. 
According to a 1987 survey, there were 
2.4 million individuals age 70 to 74 in 
West Germany (1 .5 million women and 
0.9 million men) . Because women live 
longer than men, and because they tend 
to marry men several years older than 
themselves, women are much more 
likely to experience the death of a 
spouse. Only 34 percent of elderly 
women , but 81 percent of elderly men, 
lived together with their spouse in a 
household in 1987. Of all women age 70 
to 74, 54 percent lived in a one-person 
household. As in the United States, the 
elderly appear to prefer to live indepen-
dently rather than move in with children. 
Only 12 percent of women age 70 to 74 
lived with their adult children . 
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Migration of ~thnic Germans 
During the turbulent years of World 
War II, millions of Europeans were 
uprooted from their homes and forced 
to move to other countries. In Nazi Ger-
many, massive relocations of residents 
were used as a strategic political device 
even before the war to implement the 
"Germanization of the East." 
After the Nazi surrender in May 1945, 
control of the war-devastated country 
was divided among the four major vic-
tors: the United Kingdom, France, the 
United States, and the Soviet Union. At 
the Potsdam Conference later that year, 
these powers also changed the face of 
eastern Europe by transferring former 
German territory east of the Oder and 
Neisse Rivers to Poland and the Soviet 
Union; Czechoslovakia regained most 
of its area taken over by Nazi Germany; 
and Hungary reverted to its prewar 
boundaries. 
Following the Potsdam Conference, 
millions of Germans were moved back 
to Germany from the former eastern 
territories. In the bitter postwar climate, 
all German-speaking residents were forci-
bly expelled from Czechoslovakia. The 
most massive relocation of Germans 
occurred after Poland and the Soviet 
Union gained control of the territory east 
of the Oder and Neisse Rivers. In 1946, 
the first German postwar census found 
that 9.7 million residents, about 16 per-
cent of the total German population, 
had been moved out of this disputed ter-
ritory after the war. Between 1946 and 
1950, another 12 million Germans were 
forced to move west of the Oder and 
Neisse Rivers. 
In addition to the massive influx of Ger-
mans from the former German territor-
ies, there were other significant move-
ments into and out of Germany just after 
the war. Prisoners of war, displaced per-
sons, and others migrated from Ger-
many back to their home countries. 
At the same time, there was a reshuf-
fling of residents between the occupied 
zones of Germany. Negotiations to ere-
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ate a unified Germany had failed . The 
fundamental political and economic dif-
ferences between the Soviet Union and 
the Western Allies were already being 
reflected in their respective zones. Politi-
cal tensions were heightened and con-
flicts arose, not only between the super-
powers, but between eastern and west-
ern parts of occupied Germany. 
Germans began to realize that, by virtue 
of where they lived, they were choosing 
one system over another. Movement 
across the border increased, and this 
migration stream, even when its aim was 
primarily reuniting families, assumed a 
political significance that continued 
until 1990. 
In 1949, the German territory occu-
pied by the Western Allies united to form 
the Federal Republic of Germany. One 
month later, the Soviet-occupied zone 
was proclaimed the German Democratic 
Republic. After the establishment of the 
FAG and GDR, the primary migratory 
movement flowed from the east to the 
west. Ethnic Germans and ex-patriots 
continued to enter West Germany from 
eastern and southern Europe. 
Between 1950 and 1960, roughly 
200,000 people each year left the GDR to 
re-settle in the FAG. These movements 
were illegal under East German law but 
they were easily accomplished because 
the borders were loosely controlled, 
especially in Berlin . Although slipping 
from East to West Germany was rela-
tively easy, bringing along household 
effects was not. Many sacrificed all their 
personal property to move to the West. 
Significant losses of population 
through migration to the West served 
to destablize the GDR. Migration ebbed 
and flowed as the East German system 
underwent various phases of its transfor-
mation to communism. Between 1950 
and 1961, some 2.6 million people 
migrated from East to West Germany, 
a tremendous number considering that 
the total East German population was 17 
million at that time. 
In August 1961, the government of the 
GDR erected a concrete wall along the 
Table 4. Immigration to West Germany, 1950-1989 
Population in thousands 
Country 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-88 1950-88 1989 
Total 1,960 2,493 1,828 1,371 7,652 na 
Germans 2,643 840 504 811 4,798 721 
East Germany 2,203 618 149 204 3,174 344 
Poland 292 111 203 382 988 250 
USSR 14 9 57 78 157 98 
Czechoslovakia 20 56 12 11 99 2 
Romania 3 16 71 128 219 23 
Other 110 30 12 8 160 4 
Non-Germans - 683 1,653 1,324 561 2,855 na 
Source : Bundesausgleichsamt, Aufnahmeverfahren, various issues. 
line separating East and West Berlin. 
The wall was virtually impenetrable 
except at gates protected by vigilant mili-
tary guards. It became nearly impossible 
to cross the border without official 
papers. The number of people migrating 
from East to West Germany decreased 
drastically (see Table 4) . At the same 
time, however, moving . across the bor-
der for " family reunification " became 
legal, providing a limited number of East 
Germans the opportunity to migrate 
legally. Between 1962 and 1988, 560,000 
people moved from the GDR to the FRG, 
68 percent with official papers. 
By the mid-1980s, however, pressure 
to remove the strict limits on movement 
across the border had become over-
whelming . The East-to-West flow 
increased again in reaction to internal 
political problems, agreements between 
the East and West German govern-
ments, and a new openness encouraged 
by reforms introduced by the Soviet 
Union 's leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. 
The most spectacular migration peak 
occurred in 1989, when 344,000 people, 
2 percent of the East German population 
and 3 percent of the labor force, moved 
to West Germany. The exodus hit some 
sections of the economy especially hard, 
as discussed below. The steady outflow 
of people was a major factor in the politi-
cal process that opened the Berlin Wall 
on November9, 1989, and resulted in the 
dissolution of the German Democratic 
Republic on October 3, 1990. 
Ethnic Germans from other parts of 
eastern and southeastern Europe also 
continued to flow into West Germany 
during the post-war years. Between 1950 
and 1988, 2 million Germans immigrated 
to the Federal Republic from these coun-
tries, 60 percent of them from Poland. 
Coinciding with the movement from 
East to West Germany, a tremendous 
influx of German immigrants occurred 
in the second half of the 1980s. In 1989 
alone, approximately 377,000 ethnic 
Germans arrived in the FRG from east-
ern and southeastern European coun-
tries other than the former GDR. 
Non-German Residents 
West Germany's economic strength and 
political system also attracted non-Ger-
man immigrants and political refugees. 
In sum, from 1950 to 1988, West Ger-
many gained approximately 7.7 million 
residents through immigration, 38 per-
cent of whom were of non-German 
ancestry (see Figure 9) . Most were 
attracted by the chance of obtaining 
jobs at relatively good wages. The move-
ment of guestworkers into East Ger-
many, however, was minor until the 
1980s, and the number of refugees enter-
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Table 5. Foreign Workers in East 
and West Germany, 1989 
Country of 
origin 
Poland 
Vietnam 
Mozambique 
Angola 
Cuba 
China 
North Korea 
Total 
East Germany 
West Germany 
European Community 
Italy 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
UK 
Other 
Rest of Europe 
Turkey 
Yugoslavia 
Austria 
Poland 
Czechoslovakia 
Other 
Africa 
Americas 
Asia 
Other 
Total 
Foreign workers 
(in thousands) 
7.0 
60.0 
16.0 
1.0 
9.0 
1.0 
0.6 
94.6 
497.3 
178.9 
101 .7 
61.6 
41.3 
36.5 
77.3 
1,023.4 
561.8 
300.9 
88.7 
25.4 
11 .6 
35.0 
40.4 
34.8 
73.7 
19.7 
1,689.3 
Source : Official published statistics. 
ing East Germany was never significant. 
The east-west migration of ethnic Ger-
mans and other Europeans was a conse-
quence of the war, but the immigration 
of guestworkers was a prime example of 
a wealthy society attracting people from 
poor countries. The major sources of 
guestworkers for West Germany were 
Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Italy, while the 
socialist nations of Vietnam and Mozam-
bique were the primary sources for for-
eign workers for East Germany (see 
Table 5) . 
The number of foreigners returning to 
their home countries has fluctuated with 
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the economic or political climate. In the 
1950s, there was a net outflow of almost 
700,000 non-Germans from West Ger-
many. In every subsequent decade, 
except for a few years in the mid-1970s 
and mid-1980s, there were substantial 
net inflows. The influx of guestworkers 
was greatest during the 1960s when 
some 1. 7 million entered the FRG, partly 
to fill the gaps in the labor market cre-
ated by the decline of immigrants from 
the east after the construction of the Ber-
1 in Wall. The number of guestworkers 
entering the FRG declined markedly dur-
ing the 1980s, largely because the reces-
sion dampened the demand for the ir 
labor. 
Figure 9. Origin of Immigrants to West 
Germany, 1950-1988 
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·--Non-German residents, like these Turkish women, are not readily assimilated into German society. Germany 
is officially a " non-immigration" country despite its 5 million foreign residents. 
In 1989, some 5 million foreigners who 
were not of German descent resided in 
West Germany, accounting for nearly 8 
percent of the total population. The for-
eign population, which Includes the Ger-
man-born children of immigrants, is 
much younger than the ethnic German 
population. About 25 percent were 
under age 18 and only 2.8 percent were 
over age 65, compared to only 18 per-
cent of the German population under 
age 18 and 16 percent over age 65. The 
population of foreigners is growing 
through natural increase, another depar-
ture from German demographic pat-
terns. In 1989, births exceeded deaths 
among this group by 71,000, wh i le 
among Germans, deaths exceeded 
births by some 87,000. The young age 
structure and higher fertility among the 
foreign population means that it will con-
tinue to grow relative to the larger Ger-
man base.20 East Germany, in contrast, 
contained only about 190,000 foreigners 
on the eve of unification . Most were 
young males who were not expected to 
become permanent residents. 
The ethnic and national origins of 
West Germany's foreign population 
have shifted since the height of the guest-
worker movement in the 1960s. In 1970, 
Italians accounted for 20 percent, and 
Greeks 12 percent, of the foreigners, but 
many of these immigrants returned to 
their home countries during the sharp 
economic downturns in the early 1970s. 
Labor agreements with Turkey and Yugo-
slavia during the 1970s and 1980s 
brought thousands of labor migrants 
from these countries, many of whom 
eventually brought their families . In 
1989, 33 percent of the non-German pop-
ulation was Turkish , 13 percent was 
Yugoslav, and 11 percent was ltalian.21 
While the presence of large numbers of 
non-German-speaking foreigners (and 
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Box 3. Foreigners in Germany: Guestworkers or Citizens? 
Importing foreign workers is nothing 
new to the Germans: a 1907 survey 
counted 800,000 foreign workers in 
Germany, about 1.5 percent of the total 
population. But the growing numbers 
of workers in Germany over the past 
three decades, nearly one-half from 
non-European countries, have given 
the issue of foreign labor a new signifi-
cance in the postwar era. 
The issue raises many sensitive ques-
tions. Should foreign workers receive 
the same rights and privileges as citi-
zens? Should they be allowed to bring 
families, promoting the establishment 
of permanent communities? Are Ger-
mans ignoring the inevitable by pre-
tending that guestworkers are tempo-
rary residents? One fact appears clear, 
however; the foreigners-with their 
different cultures, languages, and life-
styles-were not always welcomed by 
either the East or West Germans. As 
a well-known saying puts it: "Workers 
were expected, but human beings 
arrived." 
Despite the related social problems, 
foreign workers are needed. Both East 
and West Germany have suffered seri-
ous labor shortages since World War 
II, although for somewhat different rea-
sons. In the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, a post-war economic boom, a 
veritable "economic miracle, " created 
a high demand for labor. The supply 
of West Germans of working age had 
been decimated by heavy war casual-
ties. The low wartime fertility meant 
that few Germans were entering work-
ing age during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Even the postwar baby boom did not 
produce a large enough pool of poten-
tial workers to satisfy the growing need 
for labor. 
East Germany also suffered heavy 
war casualties and low post-war birth 
rates. But the labor force of East Ger-
many was further depleted by the mil-
lions of young adults who emigrated to 
the West. Also, the centrally planned 
economy was highly inefffcient, squan-
dering the scarce human resources. 
Both German states encouraged the 
immigration of workers from abroad, 
although the policies to achieve this 
differed sharply. In West Germany, poli-
cies regarding foreign laborers were 
discussed openly and often crafted by 
elected officials, although they were 
extremely controversial. In East Ger-
many, the guestworker issue received 
little public attention until the end of 
the 1980s despite the presence of 
nearly 100,000 foreign workers, primar-
ily Asians and Africans. Admitting the 
need to import labor was embarrassing 
to the East German government which 
had officially solved its labor shortage 
through "socialist rationalization ." 
According to the government, these for-
eigners had come to take advantage of 
generous training opportunities. This 
was partially true initially, but foreign-
ers increasingly were used to fill the 
growing gaps in the East German labor 
force. Some industries relied heavify 
on foreign workers during the 1980s: 
laborers from Mozambique worked in 
open lignite mines, Vietnamese were 
employed in textile industries, and 
Cubans and Angolans worked in auto-
mobile factories. 
Foreigners in East Germany were 
governed by restrictive agreements. 
Only single individuals could come, no 
families. Women who became preg-
nantweresenthome. Vietnamesework-
ers were allowed a home country visit 
for only two months within a five-year 
period. Only a limited number of goods 
could be sent home, a severe restric-
tion because their earnings in East Ger-
man Marks were essentially worthless 
outside the country. Vietnamese work-
ers, for instance, were allowed to take 
out only five bicycles, two mopeds, and 
two sewing machines. 
German unification has already 
altered the status of these foreign work-
ers in East Germany. Hired to work in 
a now-defunct centrally planned econ-
omy through agreements with the for-
mer GDR, their legal position is tenu-
ous. With growing unemployment 
within eastern Germany, many foreign 
workers have been dismissed before 
the termination of their contracts. 
About 10,000 to 12,000 foreign workers 
in East Germany intend to live there 
permanently, or at least for the present. 
Some have tried to gain refugee status 
and seek political asylum. The rest 
either have already returned or will 
return in the near future. 
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There has always been subtle discrim-
ination against foreigners, but in the 
political and economic unrest leading 
up to unification, public resentment 
has become more open and virulent, 
particularly in East Germany. The 
absence of public information and dis-
cussion about the foreigners in the for-
mer GDR had fueled unfounded fears 
and misunderstandings. And, after uni-
fication, foreign workers suddenly 
became competitors for jobs sought by 
East Germans. 
Aliens in West Germany occupy a pre-
carious legal status that will extend to 
the foreigners in East Germany. There 
are numerous obstacles for obtaining 
citizenship or even permanent resi-
dency, and the regulations are likely to 
change further. In 1990, foreigners had 
to prove legal residence in West Ger-
many for eight years before they were 
eligible for citizenship. They can be 
deported for a variety of reasons, their 
right to unemployment compensation 
is unevenly protected, and the rules 
governing the rights of workers' family 
members have fluctuated radically 
over the past four decades. Their chil-
dren too often face failure in German 
schools. 
Discrimination in housing, wages, 
and hiring has long plagued foreigners 
in West Germany. In some communi-
ties discrimination has been backed up 
by laws restricting the rights of non-
Germans. Some political groups have 
worked to improve the lot of foreigners 
in recent decades through federal legis-
lation, but economic uncertainty in the 
future could reverse some of these 
gains. 
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in the case of the Turks, non-Christians) 
has caused social and political problems 
for West Germans (see Box 3). it has 
also injected a cultural diversity that may 
revitalize the country. 
The Unexpected 
Unification of Germany 
To help understand the demography of 
a united Germany it is useful to recall 
how unification came about. The "New 
Superpower, " as it has been termed in 
the media22 did not emerge from ultra-
nationalistic enthusiasm and greedy 
ambitions that characterized the dark 
chapters of Germany's past. While unifi-
cation was born out of sheer economic 
necessity, a demographic phenomenon, 
migration, triggered it. In early 1989 the 
wall between the two German states, the 
foundation of artificial stability in East 
Germany, began to crumble. For the pre-
ceding two and a half decades, barbed 
wire, automatic weapons, and mine 
fields had kept East Germans from mov-
ing freely in their country. But in the late 
1980s, Hungary started to tear down its 
" iron fence" with Austria, allowing eas-
ier border crossings between those two 
countries. A few hundred East Germans 
on vacation in Hungary seized this 
opportunity to flee to the West. 
The news spread like a brushfire in 
East Germany. During August 1989, 
thousands of East Germans traveled to 
Hungary. From there some 5,000 a week 
illegally crossed the border to Austria 
while Hungarian border guards looked 
the other way. Tens of thousands more 
East Germans were on their way to Hun-
gary. On September 10th, Hungary offi-
cially opened its border to Austria. Dur-
ing the following week, some 51 ,500 
East Germans emigrated to the West. It 
was the largest single exodus since the 
building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Thou-
sands of Trabis, the legendary East Ger-
man cars, crept into Austria, passed 
through Vienna and jammed the West-
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Autobahn highway into the south of Ger-
many. A new smell filled the air, the 
exhaust of the Trabi 's old fashioned two-
stroke engines. People in Austria could 
smell the onset of German unification. 
Public protest spread throughout East 
Germany beginning with mass demon-
strations in Leipzig. Thousands pro-
tested against the regime in what were 
called " Monday demonstrations," and 
ever-increasing numbers left their 
homes and jobs and headed for Hun-
gary. The East German economy began 
to feel the.drain of labor. 
Would-be emigrants crowded into 
West German embassies in Warsaw and 
Prague. When they finally were permit-
ted safe passage to West Germany, it 
became clear that the East German gov-
ernment had lost authority over its citi-
zens. On October 18th, Erich Honecker, 
secretary-general of the Communist 
Party and " strong man " of the GDR, 
resigned. 
On November 9th, Honecker's succes-
sor, Egon Krenz opened the gates to the 
Berlin Wall and the entire world wit-
nessed an outburst of jubilation. Thou-
sands of Germans from East and West 
furiously attacked this inhuman struc-
ture, some with hammers and crowbars, 
others with their bare hands. Television 
reports showed· the world pictures of 
East Germans squeezing themselves 
through holes they had knocked into the 
wall. Many were able to embrace their 
relatives for the first time. No one could 
misunderstand the meaning of this 
event. A people had won a basic human 
right: the freedom to move. 
The bold decision of Krenz seemed to 
stabilize the regime for a while. But it 
was the calm before the storm. During 
the next few weeks millions of Germans 
visited relatives in the West and learned 
that life outside the GDR was different 
from what they had been told by their 
government. Many East Germans felt 
betrayed . Television shots of ostenta-
tious wealth accumulated by party lead-
ers and a succession of revelations 
about the unsavory methods of the East 
The Wall separating East and West Berlin is 
destroyed, 28 years after its construction. 
German secret police (the STASI), fur-
ther eroded their loyalty. They 
demanded true democracy and a better 
standard of living. And , from within the 
masses now marching in Leipzig every 
Monday some groups chanted the slo-
gan " Wir sind das Volk" (We are the peo-
ple) , which soon evolved to " Wir sind ein 
Volk" (We are one people) . 
On December 3, 1989, Hans Modrow 
took over as prime minister and 
announced free elections for May 1990. 
Modrow struggled to save the country 
from a complete economic breakdown . 
But too many people had already given 
up. Between October and December 
1989, some 350,000 East Germans 
migrated to the West. During the first 
two months of 1990 another 120,000 fled 
from the GDR. 
The 1989 emigration alone cost the 
East German labor force about 250,000 
employees, roughly 3 percent of the 
total. Some branches of the economy 
suffered serious labor losses. The build-
ing trades lost some 5,000 workers , 
about 8 to 9 percent of their work force. 
Some 7,000 health care workers, includ-
ing an estimated 11 percent of East Ger-
many 's physicians, left for the West. 
Some East German hospitals were 
forced to close when complete medical 
teams left for the West. 
In some areas of the GDR, the very 
infrastructure seemed on the verge of 
collapse. This ever-growing stream of 
emigrants finally shattered the economy 
of the GDR, discredited the communist 
regime beyond saving , and, in the end, 
made German unification the only alter-
native. At the end of November 1989, in 
a bold move, West German Chancel lor 
Kohl announced a 10-point plan for Ger-
man unification. It came as a complete 
surprise both to the Western Allies and 
the political opposition . 
Suddenly, everyone in the GDR talked 
about unification. According to a survey 
by the Leipzig Central Institute for Youth 
Research, 52 percent of East Germans 
were against un ification in November 
1989 ; four months later, 88 percent 
favored it. German unity became the cen-
tral question in the campaign for the first 
free election in East Germany, held on 
March 18th. The election was won by a 
conservative alliance under Lothar de 
Maiziere. 
De Maiziere soon realized that his role 
in history was to be the executor of the 
dismantling of the German Democratic 
Republic. The GDR chose to jo in the 
FRG in accordance with Article 13 of the 
West German constitution , effective 
October 3, 1990. Under these terms, the 
former East German territory was reorga-
nized into five new federal states 
(Lander) . As the former West German 
Chancellor Brandt said : "What belongs 
together is growing together." 
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The Demographic Future 
Just as we often rewrite the past, we 
usually dramatize the future. Perhaps 
drama is appropriate considering the 
sometimes whimsical nature of human 
behavior. In contrast to the physical 
world , which is governed by natural 
laws, humans have the freedom to 
change their behavior. Both individuals 
and social groups can act in unpredict-
able ways. The unification of Germany 
is a case in point. No one could have 
foreseen how swiftly German unification 
would take place. 
Because the future is unknown, our 
fears and hopes have always influenced 
our predictions. Demographers are not 
immune from exaggerating the implica-
tions of certain trends. During the early 
1960s, German demographers predicted 
tremendous population growth, based 
on the " optimistic" (but incorrect) 
assumption that the baby boom signaled 
a reversal in the long-term fertility 
decline. Some 15 years later, when fertil-
ity had dropped to the world record low 
level of 1.27 ch ildren per women , conven-
tional wisdom held that fertility would 
remain low. Scientific papers began to 
discuss the eradication of the German 
population because of the enormous 
birth deficit. Today, the wind is changing 
again . Some demographers point to the 
small increases in the total fertility rate 
during the past few years as indicative 
of a fundamental change in reproductive 
behavior. 
Since the days of the German demog-
rapher and theologian Johann Gottlieb 
SOssmilch (1707-1767), demographers 
and social scientists have tried to under-
stand what controls reproductive behav-
ior. In Germany today, one popular 
approach to the study of why individuals 
dp or do not have chi ldren (as well as 
when they have them) links these deci-
sions to key events in the life cycle. 
Within the theoretical framework of this 
" biographical approach," the time spent 
in the educational system, the stage of 
32 
a professional career, the kind of living 
arran,.gement, and the type of relation-
ship individuals choose are recognized 
micro-level determinants of individuals' 
reproductive behavior. 23 They are influ-
enced, in turn , by social, economic and 
political conditions. The concentration 
of births at the younger ages and the 
higher overall fertility in the former GDR 
provide clear evidence that decisions 
about childbearing are affected by pol-
icy measures and economic conditions. 
But despite these bits and pieces of evi-
dence, we are far from developing a uni-
versally accepted theory of human rep re-
duction. 
Three Scenarios 
In the face of these theoretical deficien-
cies, our study of future demographic 
trends in Germany should be based on 
scenarios of what could occur. We 
describe three sets of assumptions 
about the tutu re trends of fertility, mortal-
ity, and migration among the combined 
populations of the former GDR and the 
FRG . Each set represents a possible 
path for demographic development; the 
reader may decide the likelihood of each 
scenario. Three scenarios, which encom-
pass the range of likely behavior, are 
outlined below. 
1. Continuation of Current Trends 
The first scenario assumes that the cur-
rent fertility and mortality rates in West 
Germany will apply to the unified Ger-
many until 2050. It provides a base-line 
projection series , the " no change " 
hypothesis. It also assumes a constant 
net in-migration of 80,000 persons a 
year. Life expectancy is assumed to 
increase, following the trends of other 
western societies. To simplify the model, 
the possible long-term mortality effects 
of World Wars I and II have not been 
considered .24 
2. Extreme Graying 
Imagine a society of wealthy and healthy 
elderly that has totally closed its country 
Figure 10. Population Projections under Three Scenarios, United 
Germany, 1990-2050 
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to in-migration. This hypothetical soci-
ety would be characterized by extreme 
individualism, social egoism, and a pre-
occupation with health. Families with 
children would be rare. Single-person 
households would be widespread. 
A standard cohort-component model was used to 
project the 1988 population of Germany (FRG plus 
GDR) at current rates to 1990. The assumptions of 
fertility , migration , and mortalityoftheabovescenar-
ios were then applied up to the year 2050. 25 West 
Germany's age patterns of fertility , mortality, and 
immigration were used. It was assumed that the 
rather different age pattern of East German fertility 
will adapt to the age pattern in West Germany. The 
levels of fertility , mortality and immigration were, of 
course, adjusted according to the various scenar-
ios. Mortality rates were based on the 1985- 1987 
abbreviated life table of West Germany and weight-
ed to comply with the life expectancy of the different 
scenarios. All input data were available for single 
years of age. 
2020 
Year 
2030 2040 2050 
Under this scenario, the TFR would drop 
continuously between 1990 and 2000, 
leveling off at 1.27; life expectancy 
would increase to 80 years for men and 
85 years for women (between 1990 and 
2005) , and net in-migration would be 
zero . These assumptions are not far-
fetched. West German fertility dropped 
to 1.27 in 1985, although it has since 
risen slightly. The assumed increase in 
life expectancy to 2005 is equal to the 
improvement experienced between 
1975 and 1990. Only the assumption of 
zero in-migration has no recent histori-
cal precedent and is unlikely given the 
easing of border restrictions within the 
12 European Community nations. But it 
is not impossible, if one imagines grow-
ing hostility toward foreigners in Ger-
many. 
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3. Demographic Revival 
Suppose young Germans red iscover the 
value of children and all Germans adopt 
a tolerant attitude toward foreigners , 
adjusting to an influx of vast numbers of 
immigrants. This society not only would 
be more open, but would also radiate 
confidence about its future . In demo-
graphic terms fertility would increase to 
a replacement level TFR of 2.1 by the 
year 2000 . Life expectancy would 
increase to 80 for men and 85 for 
women , as in the Graying scenario. Immi-
gration would soar to 300,000 persons 
per year between 1990 and 2020 and 
then remain constant at 200,000 annu-
ally. This scenario appears unlikely but 
is not impossible. During the last few 
years, fertility in West Germany has 
increased. If this trend accelerates, Ger-
many could reach the current fertility 
level of Sweden, which had a TFR of 
2.1 in 1988. The heavy immigration flow 
could result from the new situation in 
eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 
where millions of people are likely to 
leave their home countries to escape a 
worsening economic situation. A pros-
perous Germany will most likely be a 
major destination. 
Future Population Size. In two of our 
three scenarios, the future population of 
the united Germany could well shrink 
below that of the Federal Republic of 
Germany before unification (see Figure 
10). The first two scenarios yield a pro-
jected population of less than 60 million 
after the year 2040. According to our 
" Extreme Graying" scenario, Germany 
would contain a mere 52 million persons 
in 2050, less than the present population 
of France, Italy, or the United Kingdom. 
In neither the first nor second scenarios 
will Germany become a population 
giant. On the other hand , the " Demo-
graph ic Revival " scenario projects a pop-
ulat ion size of 95 million in 2050. To 
achieve this growth , nothing less than a 
revolution in reproductive behavior 
would be necessary ; and Germany 
would need massive immigration. 
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Figure 11. Projected Age and Sex 
Population Structure in 2050, 
Three Scenarios 
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There appears to be no escape from 
natural population decline in Germany. 
Even in the third scenario, which 
assumed enormous immigration, high 
fertility, and low mortality, deaths will 
begin to exceed births after the year 
2030. The population will continue to 
grow only through immigration. 
Births, Deaths and Natural Increase. 
There were some 900,000 births per year 
in the united Germany in the late 1980s. 
This number could drop as low as 
305,000 by 2050, or rise as high as 1.2 
million, according to the different sce-
narios. If fertility remains as low as it was 
in 1985 in West Germany, and if, at the 
same time, Germany closes its borders 
to immigrants, the birth of a child would 
be a rare event in the middle of the next 
century. 
The annual number of deaths varies 
only slightly according to the three sce-
narios. The substantial increase in life 
expectancy assumed under the 
"Extreme Graying" scenario would 
reduce the number of deaths for the next 
two or three decades. But this would be 
temporary since only the timing of 
deaths is changed, not their total num-
ber. Only in the " Demographic Revival" 
scenario will the annual number of 
deaths be 300,000 higher than at present 
because the adult population would 
increase substantially by immigration. 
Aging. Regardless of the scenario, the 
projections show a substantial aging of 
the population . In the " Demographic 
Revival " scenario, the proportion of 
elderly age 65 and above will increase 
from some 15 percent in 1990 to about 
25 percent of the population in 2035; 
in the "Extreme Graying" scenario the 
elderly will make up more than a third of 
the German population (see Figure 11 ). 
Consequently, the proportion of work-
ing-age Germans (15 to 64) will shrink 
from 68 percent to some 60 percent in 
the Revival scenario and to 55 percent 
under the Graying scenario . 
These projections also confirm what 
experts have been telling the German 
public for the last two decades: there is 
no way to stop the aging of the German 
population through a new baby boom. 
Even if we assume a sharp increase of 
fertility to an average of 2.1 children per 
woman (as in the "Demographic 
Revival" scenario) the proportion of chil-
dren under age 15 in the population 
would increase only by 1 or 2 percent. 
Even in that case there would be more 
elderly over age 64 than children under 
age 15. 
Hard Choices Ahead 
The decade of the 1990s will pose diffi-
cult social , economic, and political prob-
lems for the newly united Germany. 
While internal demographic factors will 
shape the size and composition of the 
German population, external forces, 
such as ethnic and economic strife in 
the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and 
around the world , will shape the global 
context and concerns of German policy 
makers. Difficult choices lie ahead in 
addressing Germany's dilemmas of 
avoiding-or at least managing-a pop-
ulation decline, serving an increasingly 
older population, and balancing social 
and economic demands within a more 
multi-cultural Germany and an emerg-
ing European Community. 
Prospects for Population Growth 
Two key factors will determine Germa-
ny's demographic future : immigration 
and fertility. Both are politically sensitive 
subjects. Public opinion is sharply polar-
ized on the question of immigration. Dur-
ing the past few decades the West Ger-
man government has been officially a 
" non-immigration country, " despite the 
fact that hundreds of thousands of for-
eign guestworkers and Germans from 
eastern Europe have settled in West Ger-
many. We cannot predict the future, but 
it is possible that the united Germany 
will possess enough confidence and 
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international openness to permit higher 
immigration . As a member of the Euro-
pean Community (EC), Germany already 
has relaxed immigration restrictions for 
people from other EC countries. But 
immigration alone, which is mainly from 
non-EC countries, could hardly counter-
balance the large birth deficit of the Ger-
mans, as shown in the projections. 
Immigrants enter a country imbued 
with their own marriage and fertility pat-
terns. Massive immigration can affect 
overall fertility rates, particularly in local 
areas. Immigrants settling in Germany, 
however, have tended to adapt to the 
low German fertility level. A steady influx 
of large numbers of foreigners would be 
necessary to raise national fertility 
enough to stop population decline. 
A growing number of immigrants 
could trigger old fears, perhaps racist 
incidents, which in turn could motivate 
politicians to restrict immigration again. 
Besides immigration, only a substan-
tial increase in fertility could stop the 
decline of the German population. But 
this, again, is a sensitive subject. There 
is fundamental disagreement among 
both demographers and politicians on 
how this could be achieved. The exces-
sive and racist policies of the Nazis dis-
credited explicit population policies in 
the minds of Germans. Accordingly poli -
ticians have shied away from any kind of 
explicitly formulated population policy. 
Unlike France, where pronatalism is an 
accepted policy option, most German 
politicians take a somewhat restrained 
approach, giving the issue a low priority. 
The prospects of increasing fertility 
among Germans are dim in any case. 
The current TFR in West Germany is 
about 35 percent below the replacement 
level. Even with the addition of the East 
Germans with their higher birth rates, 
the TFR of the united Germany will be 
around 1.5, still well below replacement 
level of 2.1. There are widespread 
doubts that policy measures alone could 
raise fertility to the replacement level. 
It is hard to imagine what policy meas-
ures could significantly change the 
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reproductive behavior of Germans living 
in a liberal market economy. Some 
demographers have argued that the 
costs of children in Germany are too 
high. The taxation system, for instance, 
could be changed to favor families; 
more child-care centers and kindergar-
tens for working mothers could be pro-
vided. Sweden has invested heavily in 
an improved support system for couples 
with children and Swedish fertility has 
gone up as a result. Swedes, however, 
have always been more family-oriented 
than central Europeans. 
Some experts are skeptical that better 
services or financial incentives could 
motivate young Germans to have more 
children . The benefits, so they argue, 
might well trigger a short-term increase 
With individualism so highly valued, it 's hard to 
imagine policies that would entice more Germans 
into parenthood. 
of births, but would hardly increase fertil-
ity over the long term. The recent rise in 
Swedish fertility, for example, may prove 
to be temporary. 
Many social scientists are convinced 
that the low German fertility is just one 
facet of a deep cultural change under-
way since the 1960s. The rejection of 
traditional sex roles in some segments 
of the population, the rise of a women 's 
liberation movement, or the growing 
preference for remaining single are seen 
as symptoms of an emerging antinatalis-
tic culture. Yet the percentage of women 
in the labor force is lower in western 
Germany than in most other northern 
European countries, an apparent 
anomaly. 
There are other factors that help 
explain the low fertility. There are few 
other countries in the world where the 
young spend more years in the educa-
tional system than in Germany. Most uni-
versity students are almost 30 before 
they start a professional career and set-
tle down. Recently, the German demog-
rapher Karl Schwarz estimated that most 
children do not leave their parents ' 
household before age 25.26 Social scien-
tists have used the phrase " delayed 
adulthood" to describe this unusual situ-
ation . This postponement of indepen-
dence creates a time dilemma for many 
young German women: at the ages when 
they would otherwise be starting a family 
they are busy starting a career. 
Economic factors are often seen as 
key determinants of Germany's demo-
graphic future. If one assumes that chil-
dren are an investment in the future, Ger-
mans can hardly be called daring entre-
preneurs. A large section of the adult 
population has refrained from parent-
hood altogether, and those who have 
invested in the next generation have 
only bought one or two shares. 
Choosing to have children also means 
accepting added financial burdens that 
non-parents do not have to pay, putting 
parents at a relative disadvantage. The 
costs of children are largely borne by the 
parents, although the eventual eco-
nomic benefits are enjoyed by the total 
society. Men and women who refrain 
from parenthood still expect the next 
generation to pay for their pensions and 
maintain a healthy infrastructure. The 
issues of burden-sharing between par-
ents and non-parents are gaining impor-
tance in all low-fertility countries. 
Though the economy is booming and 
the standard of living is rising , many 
young Germans worry about the future . 
They seem to be afraid of sharing their 
wealth with the next generation and with 
those who immigrate to the country. 
Some have argued that worries about 
the future might be a key reason behind 
the very low fertility in Germany. It is 
more likely that both low fertility and pes-
simism about the future are caused by a 
specific German attitude toward life : a 
combination of ever-rising aspirations 
and decreasing willingness to make 
long-term commitments. In one of the 
world 's wealthiest countries, couples 
complain that they cannot afford to have 
children . Fancy cars, big houses, holi-
days in distant countries, and a profes-
sional career have become more impor-
tant to many Germans than children or 
a long-term partnership. The ambitious 
ideals of modern society-consump-
tion, competition, and success-have 
often repressed the modest hopes for 
private happiness within a family or a 
marriage. If this is true, nothing less than 
a revolution in cultural attitudes would 
be necessary to change the low level of 
fertility in Germany and to stop its natu-
ral decrease. 
Aging: A Looming Problem 
A hundred years ago only some 32 per-
cent of newborn boys survived to age 
60. In the 1990s, more than 83 percent 
will celebrate their 60th birthday, and 
about one-third will live to age 80. 
Among baby girls, the proportion surviv-
ing to age 60 was 39 percent in 
1881-1890 compared to 91 percent in 
the mid-1980s. More than half the female 
babies born today will reach age 80. In 
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A member of Germany's growing elderly population 
demands: " Human rights for the elderly. " 
1881 , a woman of 80 had another 4.2 
years to live; in 1985, she could expect 
to live another 7.5 years. 
This decline in mortality, combined 
with low fertility, has caused the elderly 
to increase more rapidly than any other 
population group, both in absolute and 
relative terms. Between 1871 and 1939 
the number of Germans aged 65 or older 
increased from 1.9 to 6.3 million or from 
4.6 to 7.9 percent of the population. After 
1950, the graying of the German popula-
tion accelerated. In 1946, 9 percent of 
the population was age 65 or older. By 
1987, 15 percent was age 65 or over. 
The increase in the " very old " is even 
more remarkable. During the 1870s, just 
0.4 percent of the population in the Ger-
man Reich was age 80 and above. Their 
proportion slowly increased to 0.8 per-
cent in 1939. Since then, the full effects 
of the declines in fertility and mortality 
have become visible: between 1946 and 
1987 the number of very old Germans in 
the two Germanies combined increased 
from 562,000 to 2.7 million, or from 0.9 
to 3.4 percent of the population. In 1946, 
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there were roughly 10 children under 
age 6 for each person age 80 and above. 
In 1987 the ratio was about two to one. 
The changing balance between the 
young and the old has caused great con-
cern among social scientists and politi-
cians in Germany. The economic effects 
of population aging, especially the impli-
cations for financing the public pension 
system, have been a major focus of the 
discussion.27 But there is also a growing 
awareness of health problems related to 
the graying of society. Because more 
Germans reach advanced ages, the prev-
alence of diseases associated with old 
age has exploded . Germans live much 
longer than in the past, yet often they 
cannot enjoy their old age in good 
health . In 1986, one-third of all men age 
75 or more and 38 percent of all women 
age 75 or more in the FAG were ill or 
suffered from injuries caused by acci-
dents. 28 Between 1970 and 1987, health-
related expenditures in West Germany 
quadrupled, from 70.6 to 260.9 billion 
marks (OM) , largely because of the 
changing age composition of the 
population . 
Traditionally, when old people 
become unable to take care of them-
selves, daughters or other family mem-
bers have provided the care. But many 
Germans who will be entering advanced 
ages early in the next century never had 
children. In fact, a disproportionate num-
ber of the baby-boom generation (born 
between the late 1950s and late 1960s) 
probably will never marry. They were the 
first generation to grow up with the 
extremely low marriage and fertility 
rates that Germany has experienced 
since the 1970s. These graying singles 
could suffer severe social as well as 
health problems because they lack a fam-
ily support network to provide care and 
companionship . After 2030, the elderly 
will outnumber young adults , and 
elderly singles will become a large social 
group. 29 Care of the elderly probably will 
fall more and more on the government, 
boosting health and social service costs 
even further. 
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Box 4. World Champion Worriers 
"Even on the brink of unity the Ger-
mans remain world champion worri-
ers. From their moaning and snarling 
over details, you might be misled into 
thinking they would prefer to stay 
divided." 1 
When the Germans celebrated their 
unification on October 3, 1990, most 
observers were a little disappointed. 
They had expected a joyous demonstra-
tion of national pride. But the masses 
on the streets of Berlin and elsewhere 
in Germany were obviously more inter-
ested in enjoying the day with Wiirstel 
and Bier and popular music than by 
chanting political slogans. 
A little story might reveal how Ger-
man officials treated the historic event. 
On October 3, the "Permanent Mission 
of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
the International Organizations in 
Vienna" gave a reception to celebrate 
the unification . The Germans at our 
institute, the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis, were invited 
also. Remembering the excellent buf-
fets we had enjoyed at the German mis-
sion in the past, we expected some-
thing special. We were sorely disap-
pointed. There was no speech and only 
a few refreshments for the 80-odd peo-
ple who attended. Everyone under-
stood the message : "Business as 
usual. " 
The restrained, businesslike ap-
proach to unification reflects the wor-
ries of many West Germans that life 
might become more difficult in the 
united country. Three issues account 
for most of their uneasiness. First, the 
unification will almost certainly cost 
much more than expected. Second, 
the world might ask a sovereign Ger-
many to show more responsibility for 
international affairs. including military 
participation. Until recently the West 
Germans could hide behind their con-
stitution, which strictly forbade them 
any military action outside the NATO, 
but this is likely to change. Third, every-
one expects that the united Germany 
will support the process of European 
integration most vigorously in order to 
prove its support to this cause. This 
means, however, that more money and 
a significant part of the new sover-
eignty have to be given to the European 
Community. And it also would mean 
that the Germans have to give up their 
strong mark for a new Euro-Currency. 
Many Germans are aware that their 
wealth relies on an open and friendly 
world. The export-driven industry heav-
ily depends on free trade, international 
peace and collaboration . But the 
united Germany will find it more diffi-
cult to avoid the traps of international 
affairs. 
October 3, 1990-Huge crowds celebrate German References 
Unification Day in front of the Brandenberg Gate, 1. " Germany: Count Your Blessings," The Econo-
Berlin. mist, August 25, 1990, pp. 40-41 . 
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Germany and Europe 
Many Europeans, and quite a few Ger-
mans too, dread the new united Ger-
many. Their anxiety is somewhat ironic. 
For decades the Western democracies 
backed West Germany's constitutional 
claim for "unification in freedom and lib-
erty." When it became obvious that uni-
fication was about to come, however, 
many felt uneasy about the prospects. 
Even West Germans were caught short. 
They had enthusiastically applauded the 
democratic movement in the GDR, but 
when they suddenly realized that the 
East German slogans for unity were seri-
ous, many West Germans shied away 
from the consequences. 
Many Germans are aware that their 
neighbors are uneasy about unification. 
It is, of course , not the demographic 
dominance that makes outsiders shiver, 
but the economic power of a united Ger-
many. The West German government 
does everything possible to stress that 
unification will not weaken its enthusi-
asm for European integration. They seri-
ously want to see Germany embedded 
in the emerging European Community.* 
Integration into the European Commu-
nity is not the only factor that will coun-
terbalance Germany's economic domi-
nance. The country has accepted respon-
si bi I ity for the hopelessly inefficient 
economy, tattered infrastructure, and 
dreadfully polluted environment of East 
Germany. This hardly strengthens the 
economic muscle of Germany. Accord-
ing to the most recent estimates of the 
•1n 1985, the 10 nations of the European Community 
(Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, and the 
Netherlands) agreed to support the '" political and 
economic union '" of Europe. To th is end , they plan 
to create a common currency for all EC members 
(which now include Spain and Portugal) by the end 
of 1992. France and Germany also favor speeding 
up the political union of EC members. But the net 
result of these changes will be a loss of national 
sovereignty for all member countries.30 
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Deutsche Bank, the former GDR will add 
just 14 percent to the GNP of the Federal 
Republic, while it probably will add 1.5 
million unemployed. Germany will need 
an estimated DM 100 billion a year (US$ 
61 billion) or more for the next few years 
to rebuild the ruined East German infra-
structure. In addition , Germany has 
agreed to pay some DM 18 billion (US$ 
11 billion) to the Soviet Union to under-
write the withdrawal of its troops from 
East German territory, and to reward 
Hungary for opening its border to East 
German tourists-an act that triggered 
unification. In any case, unification will 
pose tremendous economic and social 
problems for the Germans, destroying 
any delusions of grandeur. 
The waves of immigration that led to 
the rejoining of East and West Germany 
are also likely to play an important role 
in Germany's future. In 1989, 845,000 per-
sons immigrated to West Germany-a 
record high, and nearly 250,000 more 
than the number who entered the United 
States that same year. In relation to over-
all population size, immigration to West 
Germany was the highest in all of Europe 
and almost four times higher than immi-
gration to the United States. The antici-
pated opening of borders of EC mem-
bers in 1992, along with continued social 
and economic turmoil in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, is likely to 
add to these flows. 
Germany is likely to become a multi-
cultural society faced with the enormous 
task of providing housing, jobs , lan-
guage training, and education to its new 
residents . While expectations of 
improved living standards run high 
among recent immigrants and many for-
mer East German citizens, recent eco-
nomic forecasts project severe housing 
shortages and rising unemployment in 
the near term. Overcoming such prob-
lems is likely to test the vibrancy of the 
German state and ultimately will shape 
the future of a united Europe. 
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Discussion Points 
1. Describe the social , political , and economic events that have shaped Germany's age and sex 
distribution, as presented in the population pyramid on page 8. Explain the role each of these 
events has played in shaping fertility, mortality, or migration. 
2. Explain, in detail , how Germany's demographic transition differed from that of other developed 
nations. What triggered the German transition? 
3. Compare the post-World War II baby boom in both Germanies. How did the German baby 
boom compare to that of the United States? 
4. How did government policies affect the timing of marriage and births in East Germany during 
the past two decades? 
5. Consider how unification might change fertility and marriage patterns in Germany. 
6. Explain the differences in life expectancy in East and West Germany prior to unification . 
Speculate on the prospects for change. 
7. Compare the proportion of elderly in Germany to the United States, Japan, and Mexico. What 
special challenges does Germany face? 
8. Describe the role that immigration and emigration have played in German history. How might 
this change in the future? 
9. The authors present three scenarios for future demographic change in Germany. Which of 
the three do you think is likely? Defend your choice. 
Prepared by Kimberly A. Crews 
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